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COMMENT: UNITED STATES V. NOSAL II
Futoshi Dean Takatsuki*
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir.
2016) (“Nosal II”) ruled that sharing your Netflix password, for example, is
a federal crime under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”). In
Nosal II, the Ninth Circuit had to determine whether obtaining permission
to use someone’s login credentials constituted an access of “a protected
computer without authorization” in violation of section 1030(a)(4) of the
CFAA. Ultimately, the court broadly interpreted the statute and held that a
person accesses a computer without authorization, in violation of the
CFAA, if he or she accesses a computer after the system owner has
revoked permission to access the computer.
The majority in Nosal II broadened violations of the CFAA to
include, for example, Netflix password sharing along with grievous
transgressions like stealing trade secrets. In Nosal II, the majority
incorrectly focused on defining “without authorization,” rather than getting
to the heart of the issue, which was who was entitled to give authorization.
By concluding that the CFAA criminalizes access to computers by those
without permission conferred by the system owner, the majority steps
toward the consequences that the Ninth Circuit attempted to prevent in its
en banc decision in Nosal I: (1) it expands the CFAA to potentially
criminalize innocuous behavior in password sharing; and (2) it leaves
citizens who engage in password sharing at the mercy of the system owner
and local prosecutor. Instead, the Ninth Circuit in Nosal II should apply
the rule of lenity to pressure Congress into reforming the CFAA to better
meet computer use norms of present-day society.

* I would like to give special thanks to the following people: Professor Jennifer Kamita,
Valerie Henderson, Tom, Neda, and the entire Loyola Law School Entertainment Law Review
team. Without their help and sincere efforts, this Comment would forever be stuck on page one.
I would also like to thank Mom, Dad, Ojiichan, Obaachan, Uncle Mark, Eiko, Kaori, Atsushi,
Kazuhiro, Kent, Sarah, Christine, and my friends for their constant encouragement and inspiration
to stay true to myself and to pursue my dreams. Thank you very much.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Password sharing has become common “innocuous conduct,” whether
at work or at home.1 For example, Netflix—the subscription-based Internet
television network company—specializes in providing streaming media
online.2 In 2015, over 44.7 million Americans subscribed to Netflix’s
online multimedia streaming service.3 Of those 44.7 million American
Netflix subscribers, two-thirds shared their login credentials with at least
one other person.4 Netflix’s service options seem to promote the practice
of password sharing, at least within a household: its $7.99 “Basic” plan
allows for one device to stream content at a time, its $9.99 “Standard” plan
allows for two devices to stream at the same time, and its $11.99
“Premium” plan allows for four.5 Moreover, Netflix’s Terms of Use do not
strictly prohibit password sharing between its users.6 While Netflix does
not officially encourage password sharing, at the Consumer Electronics
Show in Las Vegas, Netflix CEO Reed Hastings stated that sharing account
information was “a positive thing, not a negative thing.”7 Presently, it
seems that individuals can continue using their parents’, friends’, siblings’,

1. United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1038 (9th Cir. 2016).
2. See About Netflix, NETFLIX MEDIA CENTER, http://media.netflix.com/en/about-netflix
[http://perma.cc/E9SJ-ESVY].
3. Jitender Miglani, Netflix 2015 Revenues, Profits, and Subscribers Growth
Analysis, REVENUES AND PROFITS (Jan. 20, 2016), http://revenuesandprofits.com/netflix-2015revenues-profits-and-subscribers-growth-analysis [http://perma.cc/7QWP-8SHV].
4. Jason Mander, Two Thirds of Netflixers Share Their Accounts, GLOBALWEBINDEX
(July 20, 2015), http://www.globalwebindex.net/blog/two-thirds-of-netflixers-share-theiraccounts [http://perma.cc/X9D2-JH7P].
5. See
Choose
the
Plan
That’s
Right
for
http://www.netflix.com/simple/planform [http://perma.cc/TC7X-Y9EB].

You,

NETFLIX,

6. See
Netflix
Terms
of
Use,
NETFLIX
(Nov.
30,
2016),
http://help.netflix.com/legal/termsofuse?local=en&docType=termsofuse [http://perma.cc/5FKXCCWZ] (“The Account Owner’s control is exercised through use of the Account Owner’s
password and therefore to maintain exclusive control, the Account Owner should not reveal the
password to anyone.”).
7. Sarah Perez, Netflix CEO Says Account Sharing Is OK, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 11, 2016),
http://techcrunch.com/2016/01/11/netflix-ceo-says-account-sharing-is-ok [http://perma.cc/SMY6TZHS].
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or acquaintances’ Netflix accounts without fearing any penalty.8 The
Internet, however, has seen a flurry of disturbing news: sharing your
Netflix password has apparently been decreed a federal crime under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”),9 because of a ruling from the
Ninth Circuit.10 The case responsible for this alarming news is United
States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Nosal II”).11
In Nosal II, the Ninth Circuit was faced with determining whether
using someone else’s login credentials, with their permission, constituted
an access of a protected computer “without authorization” in violation of
section 1030(a)(4) of the CFAA.12 Ultimately, the majority concluded that
the conduct violated section 1030(a)(4) of the CFAA, which imposes
criminal penalties on whoever “‘knowingly and with intent to defraud,
accesses a protected computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized
access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and
obtains anything of value . . . .’”13 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit broadened
CFAA violations to include innocuous password sharing of, for instance, a
legitimately owned Netflix account along with grievous transgressions like
stealing trade secrets.14
This Comment will explore the history of the CFAA and how the
Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012)
(“Nosal I”), interpreted the vague language of this statute to avoid the
undesired consequence of criminalizing a broad category of common
actions that nobody would expect to be federal crimes.15 Next, this

8. See generally Ethan Wolff-Mann, No, the FBI Won’t Drag You Away for Sharing Your
Netflix Password, MONEY (July 12, 2016), http://time.com/money/4403154/netflix-passwordsharing-federal-crime [http://perma.cc/FKF7-C36K].
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2012) (effective Sept. 26, 2008).
10. Wolff-Mann, supra note 8.
11. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1028.
12. See id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4)).
13. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4)).
14. See Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1049 (Reinhardt J., dissenting).
15. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 860–62 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (refusing
to interpret the “exceeds authorized access” prong of section 1030(a)(4) of the CFAA to extend to
violations of a company’s use restrictions because doing so would expand the CFAA’s scope far
beyond computer hacking to criminalize broad day-to-day activity).
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Comment will critique the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the CFAA in
Nosal II, which seems to depart from its policy concerns in Nosal I.16
Finally, this Comment will argue that courts should not attempt to fill the
gaps of the CFAA, but rather, should apply pressure on Congress to clarify
the statute’s meaning and scope.
Part II of this Comment will first explore the history of the CFAA by
discussing its originally limited purpose and then trace its growth over the
past two decades to its current posture. Part III will examine how the Ninth
Circuit has attempted to limit the scope of the CFAA through its decisions
in Nosal I and Nosal II. Part IV will then discuss how the majority’s
decision in Nosal II will potentially expand CFAA liability to password
sharing—a common, innocuous behavior. Part V will consider approaches
to avoid expanding CFAA liability to common, innocuous behaviors and
will conclude by proposing the use of the rule of lenity, while courts await
the reformation of the CFAA, to better meet computer-use norms of
present-day society.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE CFAA & ITS CURRENT STATUTORY
FRAMEWORK
A. History of the CFAA
The CFAA traces its origins to the passing of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act (“CCCA”) in 1984.17 Narrow in scope, the CCCA
established only three federal crimes: hacking into computers to obtain
national security secrets, hacking into computers to obtain personal
financial records, and hacking into government computers.18 Thus, the law
was “‘[c]onsciously narrow in scope and aimed at hackers.’”19 During the
following two decades, however, Congress substantially expanded the
CCCA, which began as a criminal statute, into a wide-reaching statute

16. See Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1028–30.
17. See generally Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
1976 (1984).
18. Michael C. Mikulic, Note, The Unconstitutionality of the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, 30 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB POL’Y 175, 179 (2016); see also 18 U.S.C. §
1030(a)(1)–(3) (2012) (effective Sept. 26, 2008).
19. Mikulic, supra note 18, at 179 (alteration in original) (quoting Samantha Jensen,
Comment, Abusing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Why Broad Interpretations of the CFAA
Fail, 36 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 88 (2013)).
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designed to address new challenges arising in the increasingly
computerized world.20
In 1986, Congress passed a series of amendments to the CCCA,
which resulted in the current statute name—the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act.21 The amendments added three more federal crimes: section
1030(a)(4) prohibits the unauthorized access of a computer with intent to
defraud;22 section 1030(a)(5) prohibits accessing a computer without
authorization and altering, damaging, or destroying information, thereby
causing either $5,000 or more of aggregated loss or impairing a medical
diagnosis, treatment, or care of one or more individuals;23 and section
1030(a)(6) prohibits trafficking in computer passwords.24 Then, in 1994,
Congress expanded the CFAA through the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act,25 which added a civil provision to the CFAA, allowing
victims of computer crimes to recover civil damages against hackers.26
Up until the 1994 amendments, violations of the CFAA only
protected “federal interest” computers “used either by the U.S. Government
or financial institutions, or as part of a multistate computer network.”27
The 1996 amendments, however, changed this by expanding the statute to
cover every computer connected to the Internet.28 Those amendments
replaced the category of “federal interest” computers with the new category
of “protected computers,” defined as any machine “used in interstate
commerce.”29 Then, the category of “protected computer[s]” was further

20. See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94
MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1561 (2010) [hereinafter Kerr, Vagueness Challenges].
21. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (1986);
Mikulic, supra note 18, at 179.
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4).
23. See Id. § 1030(a)(5).
24. See Id. § 1030(a)(6).
25. See generally Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).
27. See Kerr, Vagueness Challenges, supra note 20, at 1565.
28. Mikulic, supra note 18, at 180.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B).
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expanded to include international computers when Congress passed the
USA Patriot Act of 2001.30 Thus, by replacing the category of “federal
interest” computers with “protected computer,” Congress considerably
expanded the scope of the CFAA.
The 2008 amendments continued the trend of expanding the realm of
the CFAA.31 First, the new amendments removed section 1030(a)(2)’s
interstate communication requirement, which now makes “any
unauthorized access to any protected computer that retrieves any
information of any kind, interstate or intrastate . . . punishable by the
statute” under section 1030(a)(2)(C).32 Thus, a computer no longer needs
to be connected to the Internet to be within the grasp of the CFAA.33
B. The CFAA Today
As a result of the various amendments and our increasing dependency
on an Internet-connected world, “the CFAA [has become] one of the most
far-reaching criminal laws in the United States Code.”34 Despite its
broadened scope, the CFAA’s objective has remained the same since its
birth in 1984—to prohibit the unauthorized access to a computer.35 Section
1030(a)(2) prohibits the intentional accessing of a computer without
authorization or exceeding authorization to obtain financial information,
information from any department or agency of the United States, or
“information from any protected computer. . . .”36 Section 1030(a)(4) is the
federal computer fraud provision, which prohibits accessing a computer
without authorization or exceeding authorization to defraud and obtain
anything of value.37

30. Id.; Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001).
31. See Kerr, Vagueness Challenges, supra note 20, at 1569.
32. Id.
33. Mikulic, supra note 18, at 181.
34. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges, supra note 20, at 1561.
35. See id.
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).
37. See Id. § 1030(a)(4).
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“Most claims brought under the [CFAA] are for unauthorized access
to a computer or for access beyond the user’s authorization level.”38
Seventy-three percent of private CFAA claims arise in business disputes,
and of those, fifty-two percent flow from previous employment.39
Moreover, approximately fifty percent of civil CFAA filings involve a
dispute where the plaintiff and defendant had an employee, consultant, or
contractor relationship.40 Thirty percent of civil CFAA filings were
brought against a plaintiff’s competitors.41
C. The Current Circuit Split
The CFAA seeks to punish those who access a computer without
authorization or, although authorized, exceed their authorization.42 For
example, section 1030(a)(2) prohibits “intentionally access[ing] a computer
without authorization or exceed[ing] authorized access, and thereby
obtain[ing] . . . information from any protected computer. . . .”43 Similarly,
section 1030(a)(4) prohibits “knowingly and with intent to defraud,
access[ing] a protected computer without authorization, or exceed[ing]
authorized access, and by means of such conduct further[ing] the intended
fraud and obtain[ing] anything of value. . . .”44 Regardless of whether
sections 1030(a)(2) and 1030(a)(4) are brought as a civil or criminal
charge, the outcome turns on whether a defendant accesses a computer
“without authorization” or “exceeds authorized access.”45 Despite the
numerous amendments made to the CFAA, however, the statute fails to
define the term “without authorization.”46 In contrast, the statute does
define the phrase “exceeds authorized access”: “to access a computer with
38. Ryan E. Dosh, Comment, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: As Conflict Rages on,
the United States v. Nosal Ruling Provides Employers Clear Guidance, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
901, 904 (2014).
39. Jonathan Mayer, Cybercrime Litigation, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1453, 1481 (2016).
40. Id. at 1480.
41. Id.
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id. § 1030(a)(4) (2012) (emphasis added); see also Dosh, supra note 38, at 904.
45. See Id. § 1030(a)(2), (4).
46. See Id. § 1030.
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authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the
computer that the accesser [sic] is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”47
The statute’s broad reach, in conjunction with its failure to define
“authorization,” has created a widening split between circuit courts as to
the scope and meaning of the CFAA, particularly over the interpretation of
the CFAA’s terms “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized
access.”48 We can divide the approaches that courts have taken into three
categories: a broad contract-based approach, an even broader agency-based
approach, and a narrow approach.49
1. Broad Interpretation: Contract-Based Approach
The First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits take a broad approach, based in
contract law, in interpreting “authorization.”50 Under this contract-based
approach, courts “look[] beyond how the computer is accessed, and instead
look[] to the purpose for which it was accessed.”51 If the user accesses a
computer for a reason “different from, or in excess of, the purpose for
which permission was granted,” that user will be considered to be without
authorization or to have exceeded authorized access.52 Courts using this
contract-based approach will look to whether the user’s conduct was
governed by an express or implied contract between the user and the party
with the authority to grant access.53 For courts that utilize this approach, an
employment contract can establish the parameters of authorized access.54

47. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6).
48. See Dosh, supra note 38, at 906; see also Mikulic, supra note 18, at 184–88; see also
Circuit Splits, 12 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 250, 265 (2016).
49. Matthew Gordon, Note, A Hybrid Approach to Analyzing Authorization in the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 357, 362 (2015).
50. See Dosh, supra note 38, at 907–09.
51. Gordon, supra note 49, at 366.
52. Id.; see also United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 (5th Cir. 2010).
53. Gordon, supra note 49, at 366.
54. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 581–83 (1st Cir. 2001)
(holding that an employee “exceeded authorized access” by attempting to “mine” his former
employer’s website in violation of a broad confidentiality agreement he signed as part of his
employment).
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Under this approach, courts may also recognize the existence of implied
contracts in the form of widely known company policies.55
2. Broader Interpretation: Agency-Based Approach
The Seventh Circuit adopted the broadest approach in interpreting
“authorization” by applying the CFAA to misuse.56 “Under [this] ‘agencybased’ approach, employees are ‘authorized’ to use a computer in the
interest of their employer, however this authorization ends when the
employee uses the computer or information stored on it to serve an interest
adverse to the employer’s.”57 This approach extends the CFAA’s reach the
furthest because, in defining “authorization,” it looks “more generally at
the interest of the party authorizing the computer’s use” rather than explicit
or implicit grants of authority as recognized under the contract-based
approach.58
3. Narrow Interpretation
In contrast to the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, the
Fourth and Ninth Circuits have adopted a narrow approach in interpreting
the meaning of “authorization” as used in the CFAA.59 Under this
approach, courts have placed greater emphasis on the purpose of the
CFAA, recognizing the importance of narrowly construing the statute to
prevent the CFAA from transforming into an expansive misappropriation
statute rather than an anti-hacking statute as originally intended.60
55. Gordon, supra note 49, at 366–67; see also John, 597 F.3d at 269–72 (holding that a
manager’s access of Citigroup’s confidential information to assist in the perpetration of fraud was
a violation of Citigroup’s official policy, and thus was a violation of the CFAA).
56. See Int’l Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21 (7th Cir. 2006)
(holding that an employee was no longer “authorized” to use a company’s computer once the
employee used the company computer to engage in improper conduct).
57. Gordon, supra note 49, at 368; see also Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420–21.
58. Gordon, supra note 49, at 369.
59. See Dosh, supra note 38, at 909–10; see also David J. Schmitt, The Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act Should Not Apply to the Misuse of Information Accessed with Permission, 47
CREIGHTON L. REV. 423, 439 (2014).
60. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the
CFAA’s provision of “exceeds authorized access” is limited to violations on “access” to
information, and not restrictions on its “use”); see also WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v.
Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2012) (defining the terms “without authorization” and
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Consistent with the approach, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have defined
the word “authorization” as permission or power granted by an authority,
and thus do not consider the terms of any employment contracts or
policies.61 Instead, the analysis under the narrow interpretation approach of
the Fourth and Ninth Circuits turns on whether the defendant had
permission to access the computer from one who had the authority to grant
such permission.62
III. UNITED STATES V. NOSAL
The Ninth Circuit faced the task of interpreting the terms “exceeds
authorized access” in Nosal I63 and then “without authorization” in Nosal
II.64 In Nosal I, the Ninth Circuit was faced with the question of whether
current employees “exceeded authorized access” when they used their
passwords to download information and source lists for a developing
competitor.65 The court chose to adopt a narrow interpretation of the
CFAA’s phrase “exceeds authorized access,” limiting the provision’s
application to the unauthorized access of a computer, and not to the misuse
or misappropriation of its information.66 Under this approach, a user
violates the CFAA when the user does not have authority to access the
computer in the first place—it does not matter how the user uses the

“exceeds authorized access” narrowly to apply only when an individual accesses a computer
without permission or obtains or alters information on a computer beyond that which he is
authorized to access, so as not to “transform a statute meant to target hackers into a vehicle for
imputing liability to workers who access computers or information in bad faith, or who disregard
a use policy,” especially where there are other remedies for such grievances).
61. See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir.
2012) (holding “that an employee is authorized to access a computer when his employer approves
or sanctions his admission to that computer”); LRVC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127,
1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009) (defining the word “authorization” as “permission or power granted
by an authority” and holding that an employee who was given a company password and used that
password to access the company’s website to obtain confidential company statistical data was
“authorized” to access and use the information on the company’s website).
62. See Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1028; Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1129, 1333.
63. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2012).
64. See United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2016).
65. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856.
66. Id. at 863–64.
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computer.67 The court thereby eliminated the possibility of employers
manipulating computer-use agreements and personnel policies turning such
employee relationships into ones policed by criminal law.
Then, in Nosal II, the court was faced with the question of whether
the CFAA’s prohibition extended to a former employee whose computer
access was rescinded, but who accessed the computer by using a current
employee’s login credentials with that employee’s permission.68 The court
concluded that the phrase “‘without authorization’ is an unambiguous, nontechnical term that, given its plain and ordinary meaning, means accessing
a protected computer without permission.”69 Thus, the court reasoned that
the definition of “without authorization” “has a simple corollary: once
authorization to access a computer has been affirmatively revoked, the user
cannot sidestep the statute by going through the back door and accessing
the computer through a third party.”70
A. Facts
David Nosal was a high-level regional director at Korn/Ferry
International, a global executive search firm headquartered in Los Angeles
with offices in San Francisco and Redwood City, California.71 Nosal
“worked for Korn/Ferry from approximately April 1996 until October
2004.”72
“Korn/Ferry’s bread and butter was identifying and
recommending potential candidates for corporate” executives and other
high-level positions.73 “[A]fter being passed over for a promotion, Nosal
announced his intention to leave Korn/Ferry.”74 Negotiations ensued and
Nosal entered into a Separation and General Release Agreement and an
Independent Contractor Agreement with Korn/Ferry.75
In these
67. See id.
68. See Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1028–29.
69. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1028.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1030; United States v. Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
72. Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.
73. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1030; see also Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.
74. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1030.
75. Id.; Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.
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agreements, Nosal agreed to serve as an independent contractor to
Korn/Ferry for roughly a year, and he “agreed not to perform executive
search[es] or related services for any other entity during the term of his
contract.”76 In return, as Nosal put it, Korn/Ferry gave him “‘a lot of
money’ to ‘stay out of the market.’”77 During this period, however, Nosal
secretly launched his own executive search firm with the assistance of three
other current or former Korn/Ferry employees: Becky Christian
(“Christian”), Mark Jacobson (“Jacobson”), and Jacqueline FroehlichL’Heureaux (“FH”).78
“Christian . . . was employed by Korn/Ferry from approximately
September 1999 to January 2005.”79 “In January 2005, Christian left
Korn/Ferry and, under instructions from Nosal, set up an executive search
firm—Christian & Associates—from which” Christian retained twentypercent of the revenues, while Nosal retained eighty-percent.80 Jacobson
then followed Christian a few months later and joined Christian &
Associates.81 While the three began work for clients, FH remained at
Korn/Ferry.82
In its early stages, Nosal’s start-up company lacked a key ingredient
to become competitive in the executive search firm market—Korn/Ferry’s
“Searcher” database, a proprietary database of executives and companies.83
Searcher was “an internal database of information on over one million
executives” that Korn/Ferry collected over several years.84
Such
information included “contact information, employment history, salaries,
biographies and resumes. . . .”85
Searcher allowed for Korn/Ferry
employees to efficiently compile a “source list” or candidate list for client
76. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1030; Nosal 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.
77. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1030.
78. Id.; Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.
79. Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.
80. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1030.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1030-31.
83. Id. at 1030; Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.
84. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1030.
85. Id.
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companies looking to fill an open executive position by searching the
database.86 Needless to say, Searcher was necessary for Christian &
Associates to remain competitive in their respective market.
The Searcher database, however, was hosted on Korn/Ferry’s
password-protected internal computer network.87 “Korn/Ferry issued each
employee a unique username and password to its computer system.”88
Without a password, no person could access Searcher.89 “During the fourth
quarter of 2004, just prior to leaving Korn/Ferry, Christian downloaded
custom reports from the ‘Searcher’ database containing over 3,000 records.
She took copies of these reports with her when she left the firm.”90
After Christian and Jacobson left the company and Nosal became a
contractor, Korn/Ferry revoked their credentials to “access Korn/Ferry’s
computer system.”91 Therefore, on three occasions, the three began
enlisting the help of FH, who remained an employee at Korn/Ferry.92 “In
April 2005, Nosal instructed Christian to obtain some source lists from
Searcher to expedite their work for [their start-up company’s] new
client.”93 Christian then asked FH for her login credentials, “which
Christian . . . used to log in to Korn/Ferry’s computer system and run
queries in Searcher.”94 Christian sent the results of those queries to
Nosal.95 In July 2005, Christian again accessed Searcher from a computer
in Korn/Ferry’s San Francisco office using FH’s account to download two
source lists.96 Then, later that month, Jacobson also used FH’s credentials
to log into the company’s computer network “to download information on

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1031.
89. See Nosal, 844 at 1031.
90. Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1055.
91. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1031.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1031; Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1056.
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2,400 executives. None of these searches related to any open searches that
fell under Nosal’s independent contractor agreement.”97 In March 2005,
Korn/Ferry received an e-mail from an unidentified person alerting
Korn/Ferry “that Nosal was conducting his own business in violation of his
non-compete agreement. The company launched an investigation and, in
July 2005, contacted government authorities.”98
B. Nosal I
On June 26, 2008, at a superseding indictment, Nosal was charged
with twenty criminal counts, including trade secret theft, mail fraud,
conspiracy, and eight counts under the CFAA (counts two through nine).99
Counts two and four through seven alleged that, while employed at
Korn/Ferry, Christian, and FH used their login credentials, downloaded
proprietary information, and duplicated that information for Nosal’s
benefit, both without authorization and by exceeding authorized access.100
On January 12, 2009, Nosal filed a motion to dismiss the CFAA counts,
arguing that the CFAA only targets hackers, not individuals who access a
computer with authorization and then misuse the information obtained
through such access.101 The district court denied Nosal’s motion, holding
that the CFAA covered the situations alleged in the complaint.102
Then, “[i]n September 2009, the Ninth Circuit decided LVRC
Holdings LLC v. Brekka, which interpreted the CFAA’s prohibition on
accessing computers ‘without authorization’ or ‘exceeding authorized
access.’”103 In light of Brekka, Nosal filed a motion to reconsider the
district court’s order refusing to dismiss the CFAA charges.104 Applying
the reasoning from Brekka, the district court dismissed counts two and four
97. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1031.
98. Id.
99. United States v. Nosal, No. CR 08-00237 MHP, 2009 WL 981336, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 13, 2009).
100. Id. at 4.
101. Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1056.
102. Nosal, 2009 WL 981336, at *7.
103. Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1057 (discussing LRVC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581
F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009)).
104. Id.
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through seven.105 The district court reasoned that access to Korn/Ferry’s
computers in all five of those instances did not violate section 1030(a)(4)
because the individuals who allegedly accessed the computer were still
Korn/Ferry employees with permission to access the company’s
database.106 The government subsequently appealed the dismissals of
counts two and four through seven.107 Thereafter, a majority of the justices
on the Ninth Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc.108
The Ninth Circuit, reviewing the case de novo, focused on the
question of whether Nosal’s accomplices had exceeded their
authorization.109 The court began with an analysis of the statutory
definition of “exceeds authorized access”—”‘to access a computer with
authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the
computer that the accesser [sic] is not entitled so to obtain or alter.’”110 The
court stated that the language could be read in either of two ways: (1) “it
could refer to someone who’s authorized to access only certain data or files
on a computer, but accesses unauthorized data or files,” commonly referred
to as “hacking”; or (2) it could refer to someone who has unrestricted
access to information on a computer, but is limited in the manner the
information can be put to use.111
The government argued that the statutory text could only support
“exceeds authorized access” as meaning someone who has unrestricted
physical access to a computer, but limited in the use to which he can put
the information.”112 The government contended that “entitled” means
“furnish[ed] with a right” and that “so” means “in that manner,” referring
to use restrictions.113 In rejecting these arguments, the court observed that
105. United States v. Nosal, No. C 08-0237 MHP, 2010 WL 934257, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
6, 2010).
106. Id.
107. Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1057.
108. United States v. Nosal, 661 F.3d 1180, 1180 (9th Cir. 2011) (mem.) (ordering
rehearing en banc).
109. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856–57.
110. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (2012) (effective Sept. 26,
2008)).
111. Id. at 856–57.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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“entitled” could more sensibly be read as a synonym for “authorized,” and
that Congress could have very well included the word “‘so’ as a connector
or for emphasis.”114 Under the court’s interpretation, “exceeds authorized
access” refers to the accessing of information by individuals whose
computer-access authorization does not cover that information, rather than
to the information’s use.115
The court rejected the government’s interpretation on the grounds that
it “would transform the CFAA from an anti-hacking statute into an
expansive misappropriation statute.”116 Instead, the court agreed with
Nosal’s narrower interpretation that “exceeds authorization” refers to
someone who is authorized to access certain files or data on a computer,
but exceeds the scope of authorization by accessing unauthorized files or
data.117 The court noted that a narrower interpretation of the CFAA is “a
more sensible reading of the text and legislative history of the statute
whose general purpose is to punish hacking—the circumvention of
technological access barriers—not misappropriation of trade secrets—a
subject Congress has dealt with elsewhere.”118 “‘[W]ithout authorization’
would apply to outside hackers (individuals who have no authorized access
to the computer at all) and ‘exceeds authorized access’ would apply to
inside hackers (individuals whose initial access to a computer is authorized
but who access unauthorized information or files).”119
For the court, the government’s construction of the statute posed dire
consequences for a society that is becoming increasingly reliant on
computers.120 The court emphatically refused to turn violations of use
restrictions imposed by employers or websites into crimes under the
CFAA.121 First, it noted that if employers could define “exceeding access”
through access restrictions in employment contracts, this could criminalize

114. Id. at 858.
115. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 858.
116. Id. at 857.
117. Id. at 858.
118. Id. at 863.
119. Id. at 858 (emphases in original).
120. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860.
121. See id. at 862–63.
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innocuous use.122 As an example, the court noted that an employee could
be prosecuted simply for watching Reason.TV on the employee’s
computer.123 The court was also concerned that employers might
increasingly threaten to report employees to the FBI as a pretext to rid
themselves of certain employees.124 Second, the court recognized that
computer users often agree to terms of service without reading or
understanding them.125 Hence, basing criminal liability upon these
agreements that are “lengthy, opaque, subject to change, and seldom read”
would “transform whole categories of otherwise innocuous behavior into
federal crimes simply because a computer is involved.”126
The court provided several examples of the dangers that flow from a
broad definition.127 First, as the court noted, although “Facebook makes it a
violation of the terms of service to let anyone log into your account, . . . it’s
very common for people to let close friends and relatives check their e-mail
or access their online accounts.”128 As another example, the court
considered the effects of a broader interpretation on dating websites whose
terms of use prohibit inaccurate or misleading information, stating that,
“describing yourself as ‘tall, dark and handsome,’ when you’re actually
short and homely, will earn you a handsome orange jumpsuit.”129 Finally,
the court recognized the danger of allowing website owners and companies
to determine who is authorized access through use agreements where they
may retain the right to change the terms of these use agreement at any time
and without notice.130 The danger in a broader approach is that it
essentially allows website owners or companies to make “behavior that

122. Id. at 860.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 861–62
128. Id. at 861.
129. Id. at 862.
130. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862.
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wasn’t criminal yesterday . . . become criminal today without an act of
Congress, and without any notice whatsoever.”131
Concerned that a broad interpretation of the CFAA would criminalize
a broad range of day-to-day activities, the court applied the doctrine of
lenity, noting the long-standing principle that courts “must construe
ambiguous criminal statutes narrowly . . . so that Congress will not
unintentionally turn ordinary citizens into criminals.”132 Based on the
above, the Nosal I court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that
the CFAA, construed narrowly, does not cover misappropriation.133
C. Nosal II
1. Procedural History
After the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Nosal I, Nosal seized the
opportunity and moved to dismiss the three remaining CFAA counts
(counts three, eight, and nine) that were not addressed on the appeal.134
Since the hearing on Nosal’s motion to dismiss, however, the government
secured a second superseding indictment adding additional factual detail to
counts three and eight.135 Count three now alleged that Christian, after
terminating her employment with Korn/Ferry, had used FH’s login
credentials, and, without authorization and by exceeding authorized access,
downloaded and duplicated proprietary information from Korn/Ferry’s
computer system.136 Count eight now alleged that on July 12, 2005, an
unidentified individual had used FH’s login credentials to access
Korn/Ferry’s computer network and Christian ran queries to download two
source lists from the Korn/Ferry system.137 Count nine alleged that on or
about July 29, 2005, “J.F.” used Jacobson’s computer in Korn/Ferry’s
offices to remotely log into the Korn/Ferry computer network with her

131. Id.
132. Id. at 862–63.
133. Id. at 863–64.
134. Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1053.
135. Id. at 1053, 1055–56.
136. See id. at 1055.
137. Id. at 1056.
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login credentials.138 She then turned the computer over to Jacobson who
used Searcher to download information from the database to his
computer.139 Under each count, Nosal was alleged to have been involved
as a co-conspirator.140
Nosal brought forth three arguments to the district court: (1) that the
remaining claims must be dismissed because they failed to allege that he or
his co-conspirators “hacked” the Korn/Ferry computer system;141 (2) that
the CFAA does not cover situations of voluntary password sharing;142 and
(3) that in count nine, Jacobson did not “access” Korn/Ferry’s computer
system to give rise to a violation of the CFAA.143 After the district court
denied Nosal’s motion to dismiss the three remaining CFAA counts, a jury
convicted Nosal on all counts.144 Nosal appealed.145
2. Nosal II Majority Opinion
The issue facing the court in Nosal II was distinguishable from the
one addressed in Nosal I.146 In Nosal I, “the Ninth Circuit addressed
whether Nosal’s coworkers, as current employees, exceeded authorized
access” by using their own login credentials to access Korn/Ferry’s
computer network.147 The question before the court in Nosal II was
whether the CFAA’s prohibition extended to former employees whose
138. Id.
139. Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1056.
140. Id. at 1055.
141. Id. at 1060.
142. Id. at 1061–62.
143. Id. at 1062.
144. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1031–32.
145. Id. at 1028.
146. See id. at 1029 (comparing the Nosal I court’s addressing of whether current
Korn/Ferry employees who downloaded proprietary information in violation of Korn/Ferry’s
confidentiality and computer policies “‘exceed[ed] authorized access’ with intent to defraud
under the CFAA,” with its (Nosal II’s) addressing of “whether the ‘without authorization’
prohibition of the CFAA extends to a former employee whose computer access credentials have
been rescinded but who, disregarding the revocation, accesses the computer by other means”).
147. See Trade Secret Misappropriation/Employment Litigation, 28 No. 11 BUS. TORTS
REP. 269, 271 (2016).
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computer access was rescinded, but who nonetheless accessed the
company’s computer by using a current employee’s login credentials with
that employee’s permission.148 Thus, the court had to decide whether Nosal
and his accomplices’ use of FH’s login credentials to access Korn/Ferry’s
Searcher database after their login credentials were revoked violated
section 1030(a)(4).149
Again, the court in Nosal II faced deciphering the meaning of the first
prong of section 1030(a)(4) that was at issue in Nosal I: accessing a
computer “without authorization” “knowingly and with intent to
defraud.”150 The Ninth Circuit had already defined the term “without
authorization” in the previous Brekka and Nosal I cases.151 Reviewing
precedent, the Ninth Circuit concluded: “‘without authorization’ is an
unambiguous, non-technical term that, given its plain and ordinary
meaning, means accessing a protected computer without permission.”152
Employing the ordinary meaning of the word “authorization” found in
Black’s Law Dictionary as well as the Oxford Dictionary, the court
reasoned that the plain and ordinary meaning of “‘authorization’ means
‘permission or power granted by an authority.’”153 Furthermore, the court
held that this definition from Brekka “has a simple corollary: once
authorization to access a computer has been affirmatively revoked, the user
cannot sidestep the statute by going through the back door and accessing
the computer through a third party. Unequivocal revocation of computer
access closes both the front door and the back door.”154
Thus, whether Nosal accessed Searcher “without authorization” in
violation of section 1030(a)(4) of the CFAA turned on whether the

148. Id.
149. See Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1029 (“Put simply, we are asked to decide whether the
‘without authorization’ prohibition of the CFAA extends to a former employee whose computer
access credentials have been rescinded but who, disregarding the revocation, accesses the
computer by other means.”).
150. See id. at 1028.
151. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 858; Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1135 (holding that “a person uses a
computer ‘without authorization’” under the CFAA “when the employer has rescinded
permission to access the computer and the defendant uses the computer anyway”).
152. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1028.
153. Id. at 1035 (quoting Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1135).
154. Id.
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authority to grant permission for such access rested with FH or with
Korn/Ferry.155 For the majority, there was no question that Korn/Ferry was
the sole entity that had the exclusive authority to grant persons permission
to access the Searcher database.156 It therefore held that when FH obtained
permission to use her login credentials to access Korn/Ferry’s computers, it
did not authorize Nosal and the others to access the company’s computers
because “while FH might have been wrangled into giving out her
password, she and the others knew that she had no authority to control
system access.”157 The majority reasoned that “Korn/Ferry owned and
controlled access to its computers, including the Searcher database, and it
retained exclusive discretion to issue or revoke access to the database.”158
Accordingly, after Nosal and his accomplices’ credentials were
revoked, they became “outsiders” who were no longer authorized to access
Korn/Ferry’s computers.159
Yet, Nosal and the others blatantly
circumvented the revocation by using the login credentials of FH, the
current employee of Korn/Ferry who was authorized to access the
company’s database.160 The majority concluded that Nosal and his
accomplices’ conduct fell squarely within the CFAA’s prohibition on
access “without authorization” and affirmed his conviction under section
1030(a)(4).161While Nosal challenged the jury instruction given at the
conclusion of his trial, arguing that the CFAA only criminalizes access if a
party circumvents a technological barrier, the majority found no such
requirement and concluded that the instruction was a fair and accurate
characterization of the term “without authorization.”162

155. See id. at 1030; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4).
156. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1035–36.
157. Id. at 1035 n.7.
158. See id. at 1035–36.
159. Id. at 1036.
160. See id.
161. United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1038 (9th Cir. 2016).
162. Id. at 1038-39.
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IV. ARGUMENTS
A. The Court’s Majority Improperly Concluded that a Person
Necessarily Accesses a Computer Account “Without
Authorization” if He Does so Without the Permission of the System
Owner.
For the majority, the issue in Nosal II was straightforward: “whether
the ‘without authorization’ prohibition of the CFAA extends to a former
employee whose computer access credentials have been rescinded but who,
disregarding the revocation, accesses the computer by other means.”163
The CFAA statute fails to define the terms “without authorization.”164
Nonetheless, per the majority, the Brekka opinion provided a proper
definition: “‘[A] person uses a computer “without authorization” . . . when
the employer has rescinded permission to access the computer and the
defendant uses the computer anyway.’”165 “‘Without authorization’ is an
unambiguous, non-technical term that, given its plain and ordinary
meaning, means accessing a protected computer without permission.”166
In Brekka, the Ninth Circuit defined the word “authorization” as
“‘permission or power granted by an authority.’”167 Hence, an individual
exceeds authorization when the individual “is authorized to use a computer
for certain purposes but goes beyond those limitations.”168 Further, “a
person who uses a computer ‘without authorization’ has no rights, limited
or otherwise, to access the computer in question.”169 There, Brekka used
his password, supplied by his employer, LVRC, to access LVRC’s website
to obtain confidential company data.170 Brekka then e-mailed the data to
the e-mail account he shared with his wife and proceeded to use it in his

163. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1029.
164. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2012) (effective Sept. 26, 2008).
165. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1029 (alteration in original) (quoting LRVC Holdings LLC v.
Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009)).
166. Id. at 1028.
167. Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1133 (citation omitted).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1129.
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own consulting business.171 The court reasoned that because LVRC
provided Brekka with the passsword, LRVC authorized Brekka to access
and use the information on LVRC’s website, supporting the court’s holding
that he did not violate the CFAA.172
This Comment does not dispute the plain ordinary meaning that the
Ninth Circuit attached to “without authorization.” Rather, it argues that the
majority in Nosal II failed to adequately clarify who is entitled to give
authorization in circumstances where a computer system is accessed with
the permission of a valid account holder.173 After appealing to the
“ordinary meaning” and multiple dictionaries to corroborate the definition
of “authorization” supplied by Brekka, the majority concluded that the
CFAA criminalizes access to computers by those who do not have
permission from the system owner.174 Thus, the majority concluded that
Korn/Ferry, as owner and controller of access to its computers, had
exclusive discretion to issue or revoke access to the Searcher database.175
The majority in Nosal II is incorrect to conclude that a person
necessarily accesses a computer account “without authorization” if he or
she does so without the permission of the system owner. Although a
system owner’s policies may prohibit access to third parties through
password sharing, legitimate account holders commonly “authorize” access
of their accounts to others by lending their login credentials.176 In
justifying its refusal to base criminal liability on violations of private
computer use policies to avoid criminalizing “otherwise innocuous
behavior,” the Nosal I court pointed to password sharing in violation of
Facebook’s Terms of Service as an example.177 It is a violation of
Facebook’s Terms of Service to allow outsiders to use one’s login
credentials.178 Yet, as the court in Nosal I pointed out, it is “very common
171. Id. at 1129–30.
172. See Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1135.
173. See Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1052 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 1035–36.
175. Id.
176. See Orin S. Kerr, Essay, Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143,
1174, 1179 (2016); see also Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1051 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting).
177. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 861 (9th Cir. 2012).
178. See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK (Jan. 30, 2015),
http://www.facebook.com/terms [http://perma.cc/6S9U-CN5V]; see also Nosal, 676 F.3d at 861.
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for people to let close friends and relatives check their e-mail or access
their online accounts.”179
Password sharing of Netflix accounts provides another example. In
2015, over 44.7 million Americans held legitimate Netflix accounts, of
which two-thirds shared their login credentials with at least one other
person.180 In both the Facebook and Netflix examples, legitimate account
holders commonly “authorize” third parties to access their accounts.181
Those third parties then access computer systems owned by entities that
grant access to the account holders.182 While both the account holders and
the third parties may be aware that, if discovered, they may lose access to
their online accounts or face a monetary penalty, few would imagine that
they would go to federal prison for doing so.183
Furthermore, the dictionary definitions and the cases cited by the
majority do not support the conclusion that “authorization” necessarily
comes from the system owner. The majority relied upon the definition of
“authorization” put forth in Brekka, which defined “authorization” as
“‘permission or power granted by an authority.’”184 There, the majority
appealed to the ordinary meaning of the words “without authorization” and
several dictionaries to corroborate this definition.185 “Black’s Law
Dictionary defines ‘authorization’ as ‘[o]fficial permission to do
something; sanction or warrant.’ The Oxford English Dictionary defines it
as . . . ‘to give official permission for or approval to.’”186

179. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 861.
180. Jason Mander, Two Thirds of Netflixers Share Their Accounts, GLOBALWEBINDEX
(July 20, 2015), http://www.globalwebindex.net/blog/two-thirds-of-netflixers-share-theiraccounts [http://perma.cc/X9D2-JH7P]; Jitender Miglani, Netflix 2015 Revenues, Profits, and
Subscribers Growth Analysis, REVENUES AND PROFITS (Jan. 20, 2016),
http://revenuesandprofits.com/netflix-2015-revenues-profits-and-subscribers-growth-analysis
[http://perma.cc/7QWP-8SHV].
181. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 861; Mander, supra note 180.
182. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 861; Mander, supra note 180.
183. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 861.
184. Id. at 856; Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1133 (citation omitted).
185. See Nosal, 844 at 1035.
186. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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To support its contention that “without authorization” deserves a
dictionary definition, the majority cited to Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuit
cases that used dictionaries to give meaning to terms.187 In Pulte Homes,
Inc. v. Laborer’s International Union of North America,188 the Sixth Circuit
held that it is “[c]ommonly understood . . . [that] a defendant who accesses
a computer ‘without authorization’ does so without sanction or
permission.”189 Similarly, in WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v.
Miller, the Fourth Circuit held that based on the common meaning of
“authorization,” an employee “accesses a computer ‘without authorization’
when he gains admission to a computer without approval.”190
The dictionary definitions the majority cited, however, do not support
the conclusion that the CFAA criminalizes access by those without the
system owner’s permission. The text of the CFAA statute does not
explicitly require persons to obtain the permission of a system holder; it
may also be properly read to criminalize computer access only by those
without the permission of “either a legitimate account holder or the system
owner.”191 While the dictionary defines “authorization” as receiving
permission from a person with authority,192 none of those definitions
suggest that such permission cannot come from a valid account holder. At
best, as the Second Circuit concluded in United States v. Valle, while citing
the Random House Dictionary, the “common usage of ‘authorization’
suggests that one ‘accesses a computer without authorization’ if he
accesses a computer without permission to do so at all.”193
Additionally, the cases the majority cited do nothing to support the
position that only the computer system owner can give authorization.194 In
Pulte Homes, Inc. and Miller, access to a computer system by a third party

187. See id. at 1052 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 1037 (citing Pulte Homes, Inc. v. Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., 648 F.3d
295 (6th Cir. 2011)).
189. Pulte Homes, Inc., 648 F.3d at 304.
190. WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2012).
191. See Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1052 (Reinhardt J., dissenting).
192. See, e.g., id. at 1035.
193. United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 524 (2d Cir. 2015).
194. See Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1037.

TOSH_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

330

5/24/2017 1:43 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:3

through a legitimate account holder was not at issue.195 The majority also
cited United States v. Willis as support.196 But Willis is also factually
distinguishable from Nosal II. There, the defendant, Willis, was an
employee at a debt collection agency who was responsible for assigning
employees usernames and passwords to access a financial services
website.197 In exchange for methamphetamine, Willis gave his drug dealer
the login credentials of a co-worker’s account, without that co-worker’s
permission, which was then used by others to perpetrate a fraud.198
Therefore, unlike Nosal and his accomplices who accessed Korn/Ferry’s
system with the permission of a legitimate account holder,199 the defendant
in Willis aided third parties in perpetrating fraud by using a legitimate
account holder’s login credentials without that account holder’s
permission.200
B. The Majority’s Interpretation Expands Criminal Culpability Under the
CFAA to Common, Innocuous Behavior.
Congress enacted the CFAA in 1984 primarily to prevent computer
hacking.201 In Nosal I, the en banc Ninth Circuit took a narrow approach in
interpreting the CFAA to maintain its focus as a federal anti-hacking
statute, and nothing further.202 There, the court expressed concern about
195. In Miller, former employees were accused of downloading their employer’s
proprietary information, on behalf of a competitor company, prior to resigning from their
employment. See Miller, 687 F.3d at 202. Pulte Homes, Inc. was a CFAA suit brought by a
homebuilder against a labor union and two of its officers, alleging that the defendants
intentionally attempted to clog the builder’s phone and e-mail systems with an onslaught of phone
calls and e-mails. See Pulte Homes, Inc., 648 F.3d at 298–99.
196. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1037 (citing United States v. Willis, 476 F.3d 1121, 1124–27
(10th Cir. 2007)).
197. Willis, 476 F.3d at 1123.
198. Id. at 1123–24.
199. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1031.
200. Willis, 476 F.3d at 1123–24.
201. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 858; see also David J. Schmitt, The Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act Should Not Apply to the Misuse of Information Accessed with Permission, 47 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 423, 429 (2014).
202. See Ryan E. Dosh, Comment, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: As Conflict
Rages on, the United States v. Nosal Ruling Provides Employers Clear Guidance, 47 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 901, 909–10 (2014).
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expanding the statute beyond computer hacking and held that liability for
accessing a computer without authorization under the CFAA does not turn
on use restrictions imposed by employers.203 In refusing to adopt the
contract- and agency-based approaches to interpreting the CFAA, the Ninth
Circuit criticized the other circuit courts as looking “only at the culpable
behavior of the defendants before them, and fail[ing] to consider the effect
on millions of ordinary citizens . . . .”204 The other circuits, “therefore
failed to apply the long-standing principle that [courts] must construe
ambiguous criminal statutes narrowly so as to avoid ‘making criminal law
in Congress’s stead.’”205
The Nosal II majority attempted to distinguish Nosal I by interpreting
it as only being applicable to construing the term “exceeds authorized
access.”206 But the overarching public policy concerns in Nosal I also
apply in the context of Nosal II. In Nosal I, the Ninth Circuit was weary of
transforming “whole categories of otherwise innocuous behavior into
federal crimes simply because a computer is involved.”207 For instance, the
court refused to base CFAA liability upon a system owner’s use
restrictions, thereby criminalizing activities such as accessing a work
computer to visit ESPN.com or visiting dailysudoku.com.208 While system
owners commonly prohibit such activities, violators are seldom
disciplined.209
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit also specifically considered the effect of a
broad interpretation of the CFAA on the innocuous, common behavior of
password sharing.210 In the face of this policy concern, the majority stated
that Nosal II was not a case about password sharing.211 The majority
acknowledged the dangers noted in Nosal I—”that ill-defined terms [might

203. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 859–63.
204. Id. at 862.
205. Id. at 862–63 (citation omitted).
206. See Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1029.
207. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See id. at 860.
211. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1029.
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criminalize] arguably innocuous conduct, such as password sharing among
friends and family. . . .”212 It reasoned, however, that the circumstances
before the court—”former employees whose computer access was
categorically revoked and who surreptitiously accessed data owned by their
former employer”—bore little resemblance to common password
sharing.213 Because the system owner had revoked Nosal and his
accomplices’ authorization, and they knew that FH had no authority to
control system access, they acted “without authorization” in violation of the
CFAA when they used FH’s login credentials to circumvent the revocation
of access.214 Yet, the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in Nosal II criminalizes
those who access the computer system even with the legitimate account
holder’s login credentials.215 As such, this interpretation undermines the
invisible line the Ninth Circuit previously created that separates innocuous
behavior from the criminal computer hacking that the CFAA was intended
to prevent.
C. The Majority’s Interpretation of Accessing a Computer “Without
Authorization” Leaves Criminal Culpability in the Hands of Private
Companies & the Local Prosecutor.
Despite the majority’s efforts to avoid the criminalization of
innocuous behavior by recognizing liability under the CFAA if
authorization to access a computer is revoked, such an interpretation still
runs afoul of two other public policy concerns the Ninth Circuit touched
upon in Nosal I. First, in Nosal I, the Ninth Circuit warned about the
dangers of having the public at large live at the mercy of companies and
local prosecutors.216 In the context of employer-employee relationships
like Nosal and Korn/Ferry, broadly interpreting the CFAA allows private
parties to manipulate their computer use and personnel policies so as to
turn these relationships into ones policed by the criminal law.217

212. Id. at 1038.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1035–36.
215. See United States v. Nosal, No. C 08-0237 MHP, 2010 WL 934257, at *9 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 6, 2010).
216. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862.
217. Id.
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“Significant notice problems arise if” criminal liability turns on private
policies that are “lengthy, opaque, subject to change and seldom read.”218
Not only are such terms vague and unknown, however, system owners also
typically retain the right to change terms at any time and without notice.219
For example, Netflix’s Terms of Use states, “Netflix may, from time
to time, change these Terms of Use, including the Privacy Statement and
[End User License Agreement]. Such revisions shall be effective
immediately; provided however, for existing members, such revisions shall,
unless otherwise stated, be effective 30 days after posting.” 220 Currently,
Netflix does not prohibit third parties from accessing its content using a
valid account holder’s login credentials.221 What, then, would occur if
Netflix decided to change its Terms of Use to prohibit access through
password sharing? Would access to Netflix be “revoked” to the millions
who use their friends’ or family members’ Netflix accounts, and thus
criminalize their actions overnight?
Answers to such questions are ambiguous because the majority fails
to clarify what constitutes a “revocation” of authority that would give rise
to CFAA liability for accessing a computer “without authorization.”222 On
the one hand, in the above hypothetical, those who had accessed content on
Netflix through the use of a valid account holder’s login credentials may
have had their access “revoked” at the moment Netflix changed its Terms
of Use. On the other hand, “revocation” is more obvious if Netflix were to
personally serve the person who accessed content through the use of a valid
account holder’s login credentials, for example, via a cease and desist
letter. But in determining that Nosal and his accomplices acted without
authorization when accessing Korn/Ferry’s Searcher database, the majority
pointed out that “[Korn/Ferry] revoked [Nosal’s] authorization and, while
218. Id. at 860; see also Michael C. Mikulic, Note, The Unconstitutionality of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 30 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB POL’Y 175, 188–98 (2016).
219. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860.
220. Netflix Terms of Use, NETFLIX (Nov. 30, 2016),
http://help.netflix.com/legal/termsofuse?local=en&docType=termsofuse [http://perma.cc/5FKXCCWZ].
221. Netflix’s Terms of Use states that an “Account Owner’s control [over his or her
account] is exercised through use of the Account Owner’s password and therefore to maintain
exclusive control, the Account Owner should not reveal the password to anyone.” Id. While not
revealing the passwords may be an effective means of maintaining exclusive control, Netflix does
not specifically prohibit the sharing of that password. See id.
222. See Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1028.
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FH might have been wrangled into giving out her password, she and the
others knew that she had no authority to control system access.”223 Thus,
based upon the majority’s reasoning, with a simple change in Netflix’s
Terms of Use and perhaps an automated e-mail to the legitimate account
holders, the legitimate account holders and third party non-subscribers
alike may be assumed to know that the account holders have no authority to
control system access.224 Thus, any subsequent access by non-subscribers
through password sharing would be accessing Netflix’s computer system
“without authorization” in violation of the CFAA.
In Nosal I, the government assured the court that “whatever the scope
of the CFAA,” the government would not prosecute such minor violations
as those described above.225 The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, however,
refused to rely upon such a dangerous proposition, stating: “we shouldn’t
have to live at the mercy of our local prosecutor.”226 Indeed, the same
policy concern applies in the context of password sharing. The act of
accessing an online account, such as an e-mail account, with the account
holder’s permission is common in our society and often harmless.227 Yet,
under the majority’s interpretation, citizens who engage in such mundane
activities are criminals if the prosecutors and juries determine the specific
action to be morally reprehensible. Granting such power to prosecutors
invites discriminatory and arbitrary law enforcement.228

223. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1035 n.7.
224. In a subsequent case, Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1062
(9th Cir. 2016), the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant accessed a computer “without
authorization” when he accessed Facebook accounts with the permission of valid account holders,
even after receiving a cease and desist letter from Facebook. There, the court held that the cease
and desist letter constituted a “revocation” by the system owner, which the defendant
subsequently attempted to circumvent. Id. at 1069. The Nosal II facts, however, do not indicate
that Nosal or his accomplices received any similar notice.
225. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862.
226. Id.
227. See id. at 861; see also Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1053–54 (Reinhardt J., dissenting).
228. To demonstrate how the CFAA can be used as a tool of the prosecutors to charge a
person’s online behavior as a crime, the Ninth Circuit in Nosal I cited United States v. Drew, 259
F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009), where a woman was charged under the CFAA for violating
MySpace’s terms of service, which prohibited lying about identifying information, including age.
Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862.
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V. SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION
A. The Dissent’s Approach Would Create a Loophole for “Inside”
Hackers.
Judge Stephen Reinhardt’s dissent shares the major concerns
addressed in this Comment.229 For Judge Reinhardt, Nosal II was about
password sharing—”ubiquitous, useful, and generally harmless conduct”
that Congress did not intend to criminalize through the CFAA.230 In his
view, the court’s majority failed to create “a workable line” between
consensual password sharing of millions of legitimate account holders and
grievous transgressions like stealing trade secrets.231
Judge Reinhardt was particularly critical of the majority’s conclusion
that a person necessarily accesses a computer account “without
authorization” if he does so without the permission of the system owner.232
Listing several examples, such as “the case of an office worker asking a
friend to log onto his e-mail to print a boarding pass, in violation of the
system owner’s access policy,” Judge Reinhardt argued that access may be
“authorized” even without permission from the system owner.233 Thus, the
majority’s construction expands the CFAA from an anti-hacking statute to
one that criminalizes otherwise innocuous conduct just because a computer
is involved.
To avoid this result, Judge Reinhardt proposed an alternative
construction of “without authorization.”234 “[T]he best reading of ‘without
authorization’ in the CFAA is a narrow one: a person accesses an account
‘without authorization’ if he does so without having the permission of
either the system owner or a legitimate account holder.”235 “This narrower
reading,” Judge Reinhardt argued, “is more consistent with the purpose of
the CFAA” because the statute would extend only to “those whom we
229. See United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1048–58 (9th Cir. 2016) (Reinhardt J.,
dissenting).
230. Id. 1048 (Reinhardt J., dissenting).
231. See id. at 1049 (Reinhardt J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 1051 (Reinhardt J., dissenting).
233. Id. (Reinhardt J., dissenting).
234. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1051 (Reinhardt J., dissenting).
235. Id. (Reinhardt J., dissenting).
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would colloquially think of as hackers: individuals who steal or guess
passwords or otherwise force their way into computers without the consent
of an authorized user, not persons who are given the right of access by
those who themselves possess that right.”236
Although Judge Reinhardt’s proposed construction of the CFAA was
intended to narrowly target hackers while protecting civilians who engage
in password sharing,237 his narrow construction of the CFAA undermines
the statute’s purpose of preventing hackers from accessing protected
computers. Construing “without authorization” to mean that a person
accesses a computer account without permission from either the system
owner or a legitimate account holder fails to consider the possibility of a
hacker obtaining access to a computer with the permission of a valid
account holder, and then proceeding to destroy an entire computer system
from the inside out.238 For instance, under Judge Reinhardt’s proposed
construction, a person would be criminally culpable for accessing a
computer with the intent to destroy the entire network only if he or she
does so with no permission at all. That same person, however, would not
be criminally culpable if he had permission from an account holder to do
so. The CFAA cannot adequately fulfill its anti-hacking purpose if such a
loophole exists.
B. A Code-Based Approach Would Protect Against Criminalizing
Password Sharing, But Would Undermine the Purpose of the CFAA.
Another proposed solution before the court in Nosal II was the “codebased” approach.239 In its amicus brief in support of Nosal, the Electronic
Frontier Foundation (“EFF”)240 argued that CFAA liability requires the
circumvention of a technological barrier.241 Similar to Judge Reinhardt’s

236. Id. (Reinhardt J., dissenting).
237. See id. (Reinhardt J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 1037.
239. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of DefendantAppellant at 11, United States v. Nosal, Nos. 14-10037 & 14-10275 (9th Cir. Dec. 9, 2014)
(arguing that “circumvention of a technological access barrier is necessary for the purposes of the
CFAA”).
240. Id. at 1 (“The Electronic Frontier Foundation (‘EFF’) is a non-profit, membersupported civil liberties organization working to protect digital rights.”).
241. Id. at 11.
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approach, EFF viewed Brekka and Nosal I as narrowing the interpretation
of the CFAA to maintain its focus as a federal anti-hacking statute.242 In its
view, the Brekka decision to have “authorization” turn on an employer’s
explicit actions to grant or deny permission to use a computer was “simply
another way of stating that circumvention of a technological access barrier
is necessary” for CFAA liability.243
Under this “code-based” approach, a system owner indicates who is
permitted and not permitted to access a computer system when the system
owner erects a technological access barrier, such as a password
requirement, to allow authorized persons in and keep unwanted persons
out.244 Thus, using an authorized user’s login credentials, with the user’s
permission, is not circumventing a technological barrier because the third
party acts as the authorized user’s agent or proxy.245
This code-based construction of “without authorization,” however,
creates certain inconsistencies within the CFAA. First, as the Nosal II
majority explained, a requirement that a party must circumvent a
technological access barrier “make[s] little sense because some [section]
1030 offenses do not require access to a computer at all.”246 Second,
similar to Judge Reinhardt’s proposed construction in his dissent,247 a codebased approach is too restrictive, and thus fails to protect against conduct
that Congress intended the CFAA to prevent. As one scholar explained, a
person commits a crime under section 1030(a)(5)(A) if the person
“‘knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or
command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage
without authorization, to a protected computer.’”248 Under a code-based
approach, therefore, a person would not be criminally culpable for
intentionally destroying an entire computer system so long as that person
242. Id. at 7–8.
243. Id. at 11.
244. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 239, at 11; see also Matthew Gordon, Note, A
Hybrid Approach to Analyzing Authorization in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 21 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 357, 362 (2015).
245. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 239, at 13.
246. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1039.
247. Id. at 1051 (Reinhardt J., dissenting).
248. Gordon, supra note 244, at 365 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (2012) (effective
Sept. 26, 2008)).
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did not circumvent a technological access barrier.249 Although a codebased approach protects against the unintended consequence of
criminalizing innocuous password sharing, it also undermines the CFAA’s
ability to prevent at least one form of hacking for which it was created to
protect.
C. An Agency Approach Broadens the CFAA to Criminalize Password
Sharing
Finally, at least one scholar has suggested that “authorization” in the
digital world rests on trespass norms in the physical world.250 When a
physical lock and key limits access, whether entry into premises is physical
trespass depends upon whether it falls within the zone of permission
granted by the owner.251 Similar to how a landlord may grant access to the
landlord’s land to a third party, a computer owner may grant access rights
to a valid account holder. It would follow that under trespass norms, the
account holder is authorized to access the account while others are not.252
When the account holder gives his or her login credentials to a third
party, however, access by that third party is authorized only if the third
party continues to act as the account holder’s agent.253 Under such a
construction of the CFAA, if the third party accesses the account on the
account holder’s behalf, the third party acts in the place of the account
holder and accesses the computer “with authorization.”254 If the third party
uses the valid account holder’s login credentials in pursuit of the third
party’s own ends, however, then the third party accesses the computer
without authorization.255
249. Id. at 365; see also Trademotion, LLC v. Marketcliq, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d 1285,
1291 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (holding that the plaintiff’s former employee did not violate the CFAA
when he intentionally deleted files from the company’s computers and inserted code into its
software to divert e-mails from prospective customers to his current employer because he did not
circumvent a technological barrier).
250. See Orin S. Kerr, Essay, Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143,
1146 (2016).
251. Id. at 1153.
252. Id. at 1178.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1178–79.
255. Kerr, supra note 250, at 1179.
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An agency approach such as that described above broadens the CFAA
to criminalize innocuous conduct such as shopping for personal items
online, checking the news, or accessing an e-mail account.256 For example,
assume that a law student gives a colleague his school login credentials
specifically to print certain criminal law outlines he has saved on his cloud
account within the school’s system. A strict adherence to the proposed
agency approach might criminalize that colleague’s conduct if that
colleague chooses to check the weather or inadvertently accesses the wrong
documents.
The problem escalates further when the “zone of permission” granted
by the owner is unclear.
In the context of employer-employee
relationships, where the CFAA is most commonly raised, scholars have
criticized the agency-based approach for failing to define “authorization” in
a way that gives employees notice of prohibited computer activities.257
Because “authorization” under an agency approach is a subjective inquiry,
employees are left with no reliable or predictable way to determine if they
have authorization to access a computer. The result is that liability will
turn on when authorization terminated in the eyes of the principal, leading
to inconsistent applications of the CFAA. As one scholar argued, “what
one employer may tolerate—occasional non-business-related web
browsing—another might find an outrageous and blatant misuse of
company time and resources.”258
D. Congress Must Reform the CFAA and Define the Terms “Without
Authorization”
A construction of the CFAA’s “without authorization” must be
narrow enough to prevent the criminalization of innocuous, commonly
utilized conduct such as password sharing. Such a construction must also
be broad enough to allow the CFAA to prevent all forms of hacking as it
was intended, which it cannot do in its current form. Courts, however,
should not attempt to construct such meanings from scratch because it has
led to inconsistent results among different jurisdictions.259
256. See Samantha Jensen, Comment, Abusing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Why
Broad Interpretations of the CFAA Fail, 36 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 116 (2013).
257. Michael C. Mikulic, Note, The Unconstitutionality of the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, 30 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB POL’Y 175, 184–89, 194 (2016).
258. Jensen, supra note 256, at 116–17.
259. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (explaining that “because
criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures
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Instead, the CFAA should be resolved in favor of the criminal
defendant because its text is ambiguous.260 The statute fails to define the
terms “without authorization,” and courts continue to struggle to provide a
definition of their own.261 Members of the public are therefore left to guess
at the phrases’ meanings and speculate as to whether their conduct violates
the CFAA. Indeed, at least one scholar criticized the CFAA as being
unconstitutional because it fails to adequately provide notice to the
common person about whether that person’s conduct is criminal.262
Thus, courts should not feel responsible for defining the scope of the
CFAA. Rather, Congress must clarify the terms and scope of the statute
and update the CFAA to meet the needs of an increasingly Internet-reliant
society.263 In the meantime, courts should apply the rule of lenity, which
requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of
defendants.264 The Ninth Circuit has already applied the rule of lenity in

and not courts should define criminal activity.”); see also Mikulic, supra note 257, at 194–96
(explaining that because the CFAA is vague, it fails to provide “fair notice of what is prohibited
under the statute”).
260. Jensen, supra note 256, at 123; see also LRVC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d
1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying the rule of lenity because “[t]he Supreme Court has long
warned against interpreting criminal statutes in surprising and novel ways that impose unexpected
burdens on defendants”).
261. See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir.
2012) (declining to extend CFAA liability to violations of use-restrictions).
262. See Mikulic, supra note 257, at 189 (citing Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey, 306 U.S.
451, 453 (1939), for the proposition that the Fifth Amendment’s “Due Process Clause requires
that persons ‘be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.’”); see also United States v.
Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (“A conviction fails to comport with due process if the
statute under which it is obtained fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of
what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory
enforcement.”). Therefore, because the CFAA does not define the meaning of “without
authorization,” it fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what behavior is
culpable. This problem is highlighted by the different ways circuit courts have defined the
CFAA’s key terms.
263. See Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1050–51 (Reinhardt J. dissenting).
264. United States v. Santos, 533 U.S. 507, 514 (2008); see also Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134
(applying the rule of lenity because, “[t]he Supreme Court has long warned against interpreting
criminal statutes in surprising and novel ways that impose unexpected burdens on defendants”);
Bass, 404 U.S. at 347–48 (holding that “‘ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes
should be resolved in favor of lenity’” because “criminal punishment usually represents the moral
condemnation of the community,” and so, “legislatures and not courts should define criminal
activity”); Jensen, supra note 256, at 98–99 (“The rule of lenity embodies two important policies.
First, citizens should be given fair warning in easily understood language of behavior that can
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Nosal I when it refused to adopt the stricter construction of “exceeds
authorization.”265 It should have done the same in Nosal II, by refusing to
read “without authorization” broadly until Congress provides a clear
definition of those terms and the Supreme Court finds the statute
constitutional.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress created the CFAA to criminalize computer hacking and the
improper access of computer systems.266 The ambiguous statutory text of
the CFAA, however, has led to inconsistent constructions of its meaning
and scope.267 As a product of the 1980s, when computer systems were
relatively rare and single-purposed, the CFAA has not kept up with a
society where millions of users use computer systems for everyday
activities.
In Nosal II, the Ninth Circuit attempted to apply the CFAA to conduct
that perhaps Congress did not foresee as becoming common practice
among family and friends and certainly did not intend to criminalize. Yet,
by broadly interpreting the words “without authorization,” the Ninth
Circuit has placed those who access a friend or family member’s Netflix,
Facebook, or e-mail accounts, even with that account holder’s permission,
at the mercy of the system owners and the local prosecutor. Nevertheless,
at least in the meantime, Netflix users should fear not; Netflix has not
prohibited access to their system by those who engage in password
sharing.268 Yet, with a simple change in their Terms of Use and a
revocation of access, Netflix may render over twenty-nine million
Americans criminals overnight.

result in criminal sanctions.” “Second, laws with criminal penalties are a reflection of society’s
condemnation and should be defined by legislatures, not courts.”).
265. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863–64 (9th Cir. 2012).
266. Michael C. Mikulic, Note, The Unconstitutionality of the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, 30 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB POL’Y 175, 179 (2016).
267. Ryan E. Dosh, Comment, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: As Conflict Rages
on, the United States v. Nosal Ruling Provides Employers Clear Guidance, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
901, 907–10 (2014).
268. See Netflix Terms of Use, NETFLIX (Nov. 30, 2016),
http://help.netflix.com/legal/termsofuse?local=en&docType=termsofuse [http://perma.cc/5FKXCCWZ].

